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RELATIVE EXPORT STRUCTURES AND VERTICAL





Over the last decade, international trade has grown on average by more than 8.5 per cent per annum
in nominal terms. This paper addresses two types of issues raised by this striking feature of the world
economy. Firstly, the entrance of newcountries in the worldtrade system inevitablyimplied changes in
relative export structures, which are interesting to map. Secondly, although the classical determinants
of international trade are well-established in the literature, substantial effort has been made to under-
stand the importance of vertical specialization activities, defined as the use of imported inputs to pro-
duce goods that are afterwards exported either as final goods or as intermediate goods.
One strand of the empirical trade literature is based on the computation of indices that aim to capture
revealed comparative advantages. The most common is the index suggested by Balassa (1965),
which uses the world export share in a given sector to “normalize” the respective export share of each
country, being particularly suited to perform static analysis. In this article we propose an alternative in-
dicator – theB *– with properties suitable to perform a dynamic analysis and with a highly intuitive na-
ture: the share of exports of a given sector in total exports of each country relative to the world
unweighted average share. This indicator has shown up as an intermediate calculation in some pa-
pers, but it has never been highlighted or interpreted as an alternative index in its own right. For each
product category, the behaviour of B * bears information on how the overall degree of international
trade specialization has evolved over time and identifies the countries that are relatively more special-
ized in that category. We also argue that, for a country, a simultaneous highB * for exports and imports
provides indirect evidence of vertical specialization.
The results are derived from the CEPII-Chelem database, which contains information on total world
trade flows from 1967 onwards. The overall world trade flows are split into data from individual coun-
tries, when available for the entire sample period, or from groups of countries, comprising a total of 79
entities. We use a product breakdownbased on four sectors followingthe OECD classificationof man-
ufacturing industries according to technology intensity: high-technology, medium-high-technology,
medium-low-technology and low-technology. This classification is based on the analysis of R&D ex-
penditure and output of 12 OECD countries in the period 1991-99 (see OECD (2005)).
The article is organized as follows. In the next section we present theB * index and discuss its proper-
ties, namely when compared with the Balassa index. In section 3 we examine how the relative export
structures of G5 countries and China have changed since the late 60s using the product breakdown
previously mentioned. In the period 2000-04 these countries are more specialized than the world un-
weighted average in high-tech and medium-high-tech goods (the only exception being China in me-
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* ThisarticlepresentssomeoftheresultsincludedinAmador,CabralandMaria(2007).WewouldliketothankMartaAbreu,JorgeCorreiadaCunha,Paulo
Esteves and António Ferreira Machado for comments on an earlier version of the article. The views expressed are of the authors and do not necessarily
reflect those of the Bank of Portugal.
** Economic Research Department.dium-high-tech) and show a non-specialization status in low-tech and medium-low-tech sectors.
However, sharp differences between countries exist at a more detailed level. The performance of the
Chinese economy in high-tech sectors is specially striking: having started with a lower than average
share in total exports, it reaches an export proportion that is more than twice the world unweightedav-
erage in the last years. On the contrary, there was a significant reduction of Chinese export proportion
of low-techgoodswhencompared withthe worldunweightedaverage.In section 4, the computation of
theB * index for both exports and imports and the imposition of a restrictive selection criteria allowsus
to identify the countries in which vertical specialization seems to be relevant. Conditional on this crite-
ria, vertical specialization activities at an aggregate level were found in high-tech industries and, to a
lesser extent, in some medium-high-tech (motor vehicles and electrical machinery) and low-tech sec-
tors (textiles, clothing and footwear). These activities appear to have intensified in the last decade. In
geographical terms, significant vertical specialization activities are predominantly identified in East
Asia, but also in some countries of Europe and North Africa. Section 5 presents some concluding
remarks.
2. MEASURING INTERNATIONAL TRADE SPECIALIZATION
2.1. The Balassa index
Assume that the worldeconomycomprises N countries and m sectors. Countryi exports of sector j are
xij and total exports of country i are given by Xx ii j j
m 
  1 . World exports of sector j amount to
xx Wj ij i
N 
  1 , while total world exports can be seen either as the sum of all sectors or as the sum of all
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 1and country i is classified as having a revealed comparative ad-
vantage in sector j. The simplicityand highlyintuitive nature of the Balassa index explainsits wideutili-










and proposing a threshold level of 1. Besides
this dichotomous feature, dividing countries between those that have and those that do not have a re-
vealed comparative advantage, the Balassa index has also been used as a cardinal and ordinal mea-
sure, allowing comparisons between countries in a given sector or across sectors in a given country.
2
The index has a lower bound of Bij  0 in the extreme case where country i does not export product
 jx ij  0 . In the other extreme situation where country i is the only exporter in sector j (international
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(1) Thedefinitionofthe“world”canalsobeinterpretedasanywelldefinedreferenceareaandthenumberofproductsasanyrelevantbasket.Balassa(1965)
did not use the world as a whole, but an aggregate comprising 6 areas (European Common Market, USA, Canada, UK, Sweden and Japan). Primary
productswerealsoexcludedfromhisanalysistoensurethattradepatternsreflectedcomparativeadvantagesandnottheimpactofsubsidies,quotasand
other special arrangements.
(2) The comparisons between countries in Balassa (1977) are only based on the rankings of the sectors. The author does not report levels and simply
investigates the ranks of the different j products for each country. Averages across selected groups of industries are also calculated. See also Ballance,


















 , thus dependent
on the relative dimension of country i. Given that Xi and XW are, in general, time varying, the upper
bound does not only change across countries, but also through time.
2.2. A new international product specialization index – the B *
The international product specialization index suggested here simply uses a different “normalization”,
i.e. a different denominator. To evaluate the relative export specialization of country i in sector j,w e
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is the un-
weighted average of this export share in all countries. As in Balassa index, if country i does not export
product  jx ij  0 , thenBij
*  0. The suggestedthresholdforthenewindexisalso1.If theshareofsec-

















sector j. In the extreme situation where country i is an international monopolist in sector j,Bij
* is simply
equalto N. This upperboundis not dependenton the relative dimensionof countryi and is not variable
across time. In every period, the sum of all indices across countries withineach sector j yields, by con-
struction, the upper bound.
3 Thus, the value of eachBij
* can be interpreted as the contribution of each
country i, in sector j,t oN. The level ofBij
* is therefore clearly dependent on the number of countries or
regions under consideration, requiring a wider set of information than the Balassa index.
This international sector specialization index also has the appealing feature that its mean within each






  . If a given country i is relatively
specialized in sector j Bij
* 
 1 , there must exist another country in the world that is not relatively spe-
cialized in the same sector Bjc i ,
*
  1 . Within a time dimension approach, if the level ofBij
* increases,
this will have a unique interpretation: country i has become relatively more specialized in sector j than
the average of the other countries and this outcome had to be achieved at the expense of lower
specialization in some other country.
2.3. The Balassa index and the B *
The Balassa index has been subject to several critiques, leading some authors to propose several
modified versions. For instance, Laursen (1998) suggests a transformation that produces a symmetric
outcome, ranging from -1 to 1 and with a threshold of 0; Proudman and Redding (1997, 2000) suggest
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(3) Note that if country i has an international monopoly in sectorj, then its BN ij
*  , while the indices of the remaining countries will be nil in this sector. 333333333333 3a transformationthat results in a constant meanacross the different sectors for a givencountry. Never-
theless, the popularityof the originalindexremains in placeand the traditionalBalassaindexhas been
used extensively in the literature.
4
As in the Proudman and Redding (1997, 2000) contribution, the product specialization index sug-



















1 is simply the cross-country unweighted average of Bij. Thus, the original
Balassa index of country i in sector j is just being “re-normalized” by the average index of sector j
across countries. Therefore, if the outcome for a group of countries is clustered around similar levels,
be it in the case ofBij
* or in the case ofBij, such result only implies that the share of sector j in total ex-
ports is similar in these countries. Note also that if the objective is just to rank the countries across a
given sector, there is no need to implement any “normalization”. The share of sector j in total exports
hassufficientinformationto provideanordinalrankof thecountries.
5 As inthecaseof thetraditionalBij
index, the value of the Bij
* will not be invariant with respect to the choice of sectoral aggregation, the
geographical benchmark considered and the time length chosen. Nevertheless, there are also some
important differences that should be highlighted.
One non-negligible difference between the two indices is that the country position relative to the
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 foreach country .
Another relevant difference betweenthe twoindices is that they not bear the same cardinal properties.
In particular, the levels of the Balassa indices may not be easily comparable through time. Whereas
the mean of the Balassa index may be changing in time, the mean of theBij
* across countries in a given
sector is always constant and equal to 1. The existence of this constant average and a fixed upper
bound are relevant characteristics of theBij
*, as they facilitate direct comparisons of the magnitude of
the different individual indices (cardinal measure).
The different characteristics of the two indices may be further clarified by a simple example. Assume
that the world is made up of 2 countries (A and B) and 2 sectors (1 and 2). Country A exports xA1 and
xA2, countryB exports xB1 andxB2. At timet  0, assumefurthermorethat bothcountriesexporta nom-
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(4) See HinloopenandMarrewick (2001)for a list of references, Widgrén(2005)for a recent applicationto selectedAsian, AmericanandEuropeancountries
andShafaeddin(2004)forastudyonChineseexportsandimports.RichardsonandZhang(1999)maptheUSrevealedcomparativeadvantagebytrading
partnerandHinloopenandMarrewick(2004)analysethedynamicsofChinesecomparativeadvantage.DeBenedictisandTamberi(2001),whodiscussin
detail the characteristics of both the originalBij index and the above-mentionedalternativeversions, end up using the originalmean-variantformulationof
the index. Vollrath (1991), who surveys alternative revealed comparative advantage measures, states that, among the measures using only exports, the
traditional Balassa index is one of “the most satisfying”. 4444444444 4
(5) For further details, see Amador, Cabral and Maria (2007).inal value of 100 euros of each sector. Att  0, therefore,BB ij ij 
* 1 , where j  12 , andiA B  , . Finally,
assume that xA1 grows5% per period and that all other exports remain unchangedat 100 euros. In this
case, world exports of sector 1  i.e.xxx wA B 111  are accelerating over time, reaching an export
growth that is becoming closer to 5%, as xA1/xW1 tends to 1. On the contrary, world exports of sector 2
remain unchangedat 200 euros i.e.xxx wA B 222 200 . Chart 1 reports the outcome for both indi-
ces betweent  0andt  100. In terms of the Balassaindices– seeCharts 1(a)and1(b)– the first con-
clusion is that the levels, as alreadymentioned, are not easilycomparable. Second, the relative nature
of the index implies that its level increases in the case of country A in sector 1 (the only sector where
exports are growing) will only be temporary (see the evolution ofBA1 in Chart 1(a)). Third, country B in
sector2willnotonlyexhibitsharperincreases,butalsoanexplosivetrajectory(Chart1(b)).Finally,BA2
and BB1 show an identical downward movement. Given the explosive trajectory of the BB2, the sum
(and the average) of allBij also follows an explosive trajectory. As for theBij
*, on the contrary, the “nor-
malization” used implies that the results are not only comparable, but symmetric and bounded across
countries (Chart 1(c)). There are no explosive movements and the index reaches a permanent higher
level in the case of countryAin sector 1. CountryB in sector 2 willalso exhibitthe highest increase, but
this willbe obtained at the expense of country Ain sector 2. This symmetryalso applies to sector 1. Fi-
nally, at each point in time, the sum of theBij
* bysector remainsunchangedatN  2(and the averageat
1).
As previously mentioned, this new indicator – theB
* – has shown up in intermediate steps in previous
papers, but it has never been highlighted or interpreted as an alternative index in its own right. For in-
stance, to flag industries that have major differences in the cross-country distributions of revealed
comparative advantage, Yeats (1985) calculatesan inequalityindexthat coincideswiththe variance of
theB
*. More recently, Hausmann, Hwangand Rodrik (2005) calculate a weightedaverage of per-capi-
ta GDPs, where the weights correspond to the revealed comparative advantage of each country in a
given sector. It turns out that these weights are fully equivalent to a further transformation of theBij
*.I n
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Chart 1
THE BEHAVIOUR OF Bij IN COMPARISON WITH Bij
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(a) Balassa indices (b) Balassa index BB2 (c) B* indices
(6) Hausmann et al. (2005) called this quantitative index PRODYj. It represents the income level associated with that product. Their rationale for using such
weightswastoensurethatcountrysizedidnotdistorttherankingofgoods.Furthermore,thefinalobjectiveisnottocalculatetheseindicesforeachgood,
but to construct an index measuring the income/productivity level that corresponds to a country’s export basket (which they call EXPYi). This is done by
calculating the export-weighted average of all PRODYj for that country, where the weights are simply the shares of each product in the country’s total
exports. See Di Maio and Tamagni (2006) for a recent application of these indices to the Italian economy. 6666 63. EXPORT SPECIALIZATION IN THE G5 AND CHINA
The technological content of exports from G5 countries and China will now be examined. The results
are derived from the CEPII-Chelem database, which contains information on total world trade flows
from 1967 onwards. The overall world trade flows are split into 79 entities, comprising individual coun-
tries when its data is available for the entire sample period. Otherwise, countries are grouped into dif-
ferent entities.
7
Table 1 reports the relative export specialization of these six countries for the 2000-04 period, not only
for the main technological categories, but also considering a second breakdown level that includes
twentymore detailed sub-sectors. AllB
* indices higher than 2 are highlighted in the table. In the period
2000-04 the six countries selected are more specialized than the world unweighted average in
high-tech and medium-high-tech goods (the only exception being China in medium-high-tech) and
show below 1 specialization coefficients in low-tech and medium-low-tech sectors in this period. How-
ever, sharp differences between countries exist at a more detailed level.
The UK, US, Japan andChinaall havehigherexportshares of the high-techcategorythan the twobig-
gest euro area countries. In particular, France and Germany have lower shares in “Office, accounting
and computing machinery” and in “Radio, TV and communications equipment”. On the contrary, the
large proportion of the high-tech category in Chinese exports results mainly from these two sectors, in
particular “Office, accounting and computing machinery”, as Chinese exports of products like “Aircraft
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Table 1
RELATIVE PRODUCT SPECIALIZATION OF G5 COUNTRIES AND CHINA
B* Indices (based on average export values in the 2000-04 period)
US France Germany UK Japan China
High Technology Products 2.4 1.6 1.3 2.4 2.0 2.2
Aircraft and spacecraft 8.2 6.6 1.8 6.6 0.5 0.2
Pharmaceuticals 1.6 2.5 1.8 3.0 0.5 0.4
Office, accounting and computing machinery 1.7 0.8 1.0 2.4 2.0 4.2
Radio, TV and communications equipment 1.6 0.9 0.8 1.4 2.5 2.2
Medical, precision and optical instruments 3.8 1.7 2.4 2.5 3.4 1.5
Medium-high Technology Products 1.9 2.0 2.5 1.7 2.5 1.0
Other electrical machinery and apparatus 1.5 1.5 1.7 1.4 2.0 2.1
Motor vehicles, trailers and semi-trailers 2.0 3.0 3.9 2.0 4.1 0.3
Chemicals excl. pharmaceuticals 1.5 1.5 1.4 1.4 1.2 0.6
Railroad equipment and other transport equip. 1.5 1.5 1.8 0.7 5.5 3.4
Other machinery and equipment 2.5 1.9 3.1 2.1 2.9 1.4
Medium-low Technology Products 0.5 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.5 0.5
Coke, refined petroleum prod. and nuclear fuel 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.4 0.0 0.1
Rubber and plastics products 1.3 1.4 1.5 1.1 1.1 1.2
Other non-metallic mineral products 0.7 1.2 1.1 0.8 0.8 1.3
Building and repairing of ships and boats 0.1 0.4 0.2 0.2 1.3 0.4
Basic metals 0.4 0.6 0.6 0.5 0.6 0.3
Fabricated metal products, excl. machinery 1.2 1.3 1.9 1.3 0.9 2.0
Low Technology Products 0.4 0.5 0.3 0.4 0.1 0.9
Other manufacturing and recycling 0.7 0.6 0.6 0.7 0.5 2.3
Wood, pulp, paper and printed products 0.8 0.6 0.7 0.6 0.1 0.3
Food products, beverages and tobacco 0.4 0.7 0.3 0.4 0.0 0.2
Textiles, textile products, leather and footwear 0.2 0.3 0.2 0.2 0.1 1.3




in the appendix. 777 7and spacecraft” and “Pharmaceuticals”are wellbelowaverage.Besides China, the UK also has a high
export share in “Office, accounting and computing machinery”, while in “Radio, TV and communica-
tions equipment” the highest specialization coefficient is Japan’s. The US has the highest specializa-
tion coefficient in “Aircraft and spacecraft” products, followed by the UK and France. These two
countries have also a relatively higher proportion of “Pharmaceuticals” in total exports. The share of
“Medical, precision and optical instruments” in total exports is especially relevant in the US, Japan,
and, to a lesser extent, in the UK and Germany. Within the euro area, French exports have a higher
overall share of high-tech goods than German exports, mainly due to “Aircraft and spacecraft”
products.
As regards the main categoryof medium-high-tech,the highest export share is in Japan and Germany
and the lowestin China. Japan, Germany and France have especiallyhigh export shares in “Motor ve-
hicles, trailers and semi-trailers”. The share of “Railroad equipment and other transport equipment”,
which includes bicycles and motorcycles, is well above world average in Japanese and Chinese ex-
ports. Exports of “Other machinery and equipment” are especiallyrelevant in Germany, Japan and the
US.
In terms of medium-low-techindustries, the relative importance of this broad categoryis very similar in
all six countries analysed, and below world unweighted average. Nevertheless, some differences
emergeat the secondbreakdownlevel. The sixcountrieshave aboveaverageexports shares in “Rub-
ber and plastics products”, slightly higher in France and Germany than in the other four countries. Ex-
ports of “Fabricated metal products, excluding machinery” are also important for these six countries,
especially in Germany and China where the shares are around twice the world average. Japan is the
only of these countries that is relatively specialized in “Building and repairing of ships and boats”.
Finally, in the low-tech category, Japan has the lowest export proportion of these countries and China
the highest, although both are below world unweighted average. However, while Japanese exports
have the lowestspecialization coefficient in all low-techsub-sectors, China is the only country wherea
specialization status emerges, not in the broad category, but in “Textiles, textile products, leather and
footwear” and in “Other manufacturing and recycling”, which include goods like furniture, games and
toys.
Chart 2 illustrates the relative export specialization of G5 countries and China by displaying theB
* of
each broad technological category over the period 1967-2004. The performance of the Chinese econ-
omyinhigh-techsectors is speciallystriking:havingstartedwitha lowerthanaverageshareintotalex-
ports, it showsthe highest specializationcoefficient of the six countries selected in the last yearsof our
sample. This result is in line with the fact that China has an export basket that is significantly more so-
phisticated than what would be normally expected for a country at its income level and also that it has
experienced a high rate of growth in the sophistication of its exports.
8 This pattern may be related with
vertical specialization activities, based on inputs imported from other Asian countries.
9 Declining
trends of B
* in the high-tech category are visible in the USA (since the 70s), in Japan and in the UK
since the early 90s, bringing the high-tech export share of these countries closer to, although still
around twice, the world unweighted average. Following a decrease in the initial years of the sample,
France and Germany have maintained their relative specialization in high-tech exports fairly stable in
the last 20 years, but always below the other three developed countries considered.
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(8) Rodrik (2006) uses the indicator constructed in Hausmann et al. (2005). The author provides evidence suggesting that the rapid increase in the overall
sophistication of Chinese exports has been an important contributor to China’s recent growth and emphasizes the role of production- and
technology-oriented policies of the Chinese government.
(9) SuchproductsaremostlyassembledinChinawithasyetlittle“MadeinChina”technology.Gaulier,LemoineandÜnal-Kesenci(2005)concludethatChina
is used as an export base by some advanced Asian economies, which transfer to China the final production and assembly stages of some high-tech and
medium-high-tech goods. The final products are then exported directly to the EU and the US markets.In the medium-high-tech category, there has been a gradual decline of the high specialization of Ger-
many, the US, the UK and France since the beginning of the sample. In Japan, this reduction is less
sharp and occurs after a clear increase until the end of the 70s. The share of medium-high-tech prod-
ucts in total Chineseexports has beenincreasingslowlysincethe 80s, but it is alwaysmuch lowerthan
in the other countries analysed.
The relative(non-)specializationof these six countriesin medium-low-techexports displaysa verysta-
ble pattern in the last 20 years, more clustered around similar levels than in the other product
categories.
Lastly, the most distinctiveresult in the low-techcategoryis the strong decreasein the specializationof
Chinese exports relatively to the world unweightedaverage. After more than two decades of high spe-
cialization, a significant reduction was recorded from the mid 80s onwards. At present, China still
shows a percentage of total exports in this category higher than in the other countries considered, but
already below the world unweighted average. All other countries have always had a proportion of
Banco de Portugal | Economic Bulletin
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(a) High technology industries (b) Medium-high technology industries
(c) Medium-low technology industries (d) Low technology industries
Sources: CEPII-Chelem database and own calculations.low-tech sectors in total exports clearly below the world average, with Japan showing the lowest value
since the mid-70s.
4. SOME EVIDENCE ON VERTICAL SPECIALIZATION
One of the major factors underlyingthe high growthrate of international trade is the division of the pro-
ductionchain,withthedifferentstagesofproductionbeingperformedindifferentcountries.
10 Aninves-
tigation on the importance of the vertical specialization phenomena across all countries of the world
since the late sixties would typically require a substantial amount of information. In this section we
compute theB
* for both exports and imports to provide some evidence of relevant episodes of vertical
specialization across countries since 1967.
The estimated kernel densities ofBM




cialization leads to strong asymmetries between countries. Therefore, assuming a priori that relative
consumption preferences are not very different across countries, there is apparently no other major
reason for one country to simultaneously export and import much more than the world average, other
than the existence of important vertical specialization activities. In short, if BijX
* and BijM
* are both very
highin sector j, weclaim that the (traditional)intra-industrytrade in sector j cannotbe the sole explana-
tion for such outcome and that international vertical linkages must play a very important role.
Severalimportantcaveats areposedto thisstrategyof identification.Firstly, it is necessaryto establish
a threshold forBijX
* andBijM
* to give us some confidence in terms of tracing situations of vertical special-
ization (and not simplyordinaryintra-industrytrade). Secondly, caution must be put on possibleabnor-
mal values of the indices and excludesituations wherethe phenomenonhas onlybecome important in
a particular period. Thirdly, it is possible that some vertical specialization exists at a detailed product
disaggregation, though not showing up at the more aggregate level. This is the case if the detailed
product is not sufficiently relevant to affect the broad aggregate. Therefore, we are not identifying a
necessary condition for the phenomenon to exist but only situations where the phenomenon is suffi-
ciently important so as to emerge in this simple indicator. Finally, if country i is a major trade ware-
house, imports are, to a large extent, simply associated with subsequent export activities. Such
activities will show up in theBijX
* andBijM




* was 2. Therefore, for each j category, we start by restricting the analysis to countries where the
structure of exports and imports is at least twice the average of world countries in any of the selected
five-year periods.
12 We excluded countries where large volatility is identified in the indicators due to
specific observations (affecting the five-year average), which are typically associated with episodical
operations that are very large relative to the size of the economy but have no structural interpretation.
Residual categories of manufactured goods are also excluded from the analysis, given their typically
irregular behaviour.
Conditional on the definition of the four broad categories, the analysis of theBijM
* andBijX
* indicates, in
general, that: (i) the incidence of vertical specialization varies considerably among the different cate-
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(10) This phenomenon has been labelled quite extensively in the literature: “slicing up the value chain”, “outsourcing”, “disintegration of production”,
“fragmentation”,“multi-stageproduction”,“intra-productspecialization”,“productionrelocation”,“segmentationof production”,etc. See Hummels,Ishiiand
Yi (2001) for a discussion.
(11) TheKerneldensityestimationisamethodforadjustingprobabilitydensityfunctionsfromtheavailableobservations.Forfurtherdetails,seeAmador,Cabral
and Maria (2007).
(12) These periods were 1967-69, 1970-74, 1975-79, 1980-84, 1985-89, 1990-94, 1995-99 and 2000-04.Banco de Portugal | Economic Bulletin
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Chart 3
ESTIMATED KERNEL DENSITIES – BM
*
Sources: CEPII-Chelem database and own calculations.
Chart 4
ESTIMATED KERNEL DENSITIES – BX
*
Sources: CEPII-Chelem database and own calculations.gories; (ii) there is a marked regional pattern; and (iii) the phenomenon has intensified substantially
over the last decade.
Table 2 lists the BM
* indices of the top 5 countries in each broad technological category in the period
2000-04 and the correspondingBX
* indices. It reveals that vertical specialization seems to be predomi-
nantinthe high-techcategory. The countrieswheretheseverticalspecializationactivitiesaremorerel-
evant are Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore, Ireland and Taiwan. The medium-high-tech sector has
some countries with high values for BijX
* but with levels below the threshold value of 2 for BijM
* . This is
evenmoremarkedinthemedium-low-techcategory.Infact,thiscategoryisdominatedbymanufactur-
ing products with low transformation like oil products, rubber, other non-metallic minerals, basic met-
als, probably not suited to vertical specialization activities but very important in the export structure of
some countries. Regarding low-tech industries, although the threshold of 2 for both the import and ex-
port sides is not reachedin anycountry, there are some countriesthat exhibitrelativelyhighfigures, for
instance in Bangladesh and Cambodia, which are commented bellow.
Using the simple indicator proposed in this article, the empirical evidence of vertical specialization in
the high-tech category can be further explored by looking at the behaviour of both theBijX
* and theBijM
*
over time (in the selected countries) and by investigating the products included in the second break-
down level of that category.
Vertical specializationactivities are relevant in the high-tech categoryand have been developingsince
the beginning of the seventies (Chart 5(a) and 5(b)). With the exception of Taiwan,we find evidence of
increased vertical specialization throughout the sample period, with some evidence of stabilization in
the last decade. It is notable that Ireland is the only non-Asia country identified in this category. In Tai-
wan, there has been a decrease since the late sixties, partly resulting from the emergence of other
players.
13
At the second breakdown level of the high-tech category, important vertical specialization activities
were found in all five sub-sectors, but particularly relevant in “Radio, TV and communications equip-
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Table 2





* Medium-High Technology BM
* BX
*
Malaysia 2.5 4.2 Argentina 1.5 1.1
Philippines 2.4 4.9 Canada 1.4 2.1
Singapore 2.4 4.3 Venezuela 1.3 0.8
Ireland 2.0 3.9 Colombia 1.3 1.1
Taiwan 1.9 3.0 South African Union 1.3 1.5
Medium-Low Technology BM
* BX
* Low Technology BM
* BX
*
Others in South Europe 2.0 0.5 Sri Lanka 1.8 2.1
Others in America 1.9 1.4 Bangladesh 1.8 2.5
African LDCs 1.7 1.9 Albania 1.7 2.1
Others in East Asia 1.6 0.9 Cambodia, Laos PDR 1.7 2.5
Cambodia, Lao PDR 1.5 0.1 Tunisia 1.6 1.6
Sources: CEPII-Chelem database and own calculations.
Note: For details on the composition of the geographical zones, see Appendix C of Amador, Cabral and Maria (2007).
(13) Recall that, given the characteristics of the indicator, there is a mechanical decrease in one country when others emerge as exporters of the good.Banco de Portugal | Economic Bulletin
Winter 2006 | Articles
58
Chart 5




























(a) High technology industries – BM






































(c) Office, accounting and computing machinery – BM






































(e) Radio, TV and communications equipment – BM
* (f) Radio, TV and communications equipment – BX
*
Sources: CEPII-Chelem database and own calculations.ment” and in “Office, accounting and computing machinery”. The latter is especially relevant for some ment” and in “Office, accounting and computing machinery”. The latter is especially relevant for some
Asian and European countries (Chart 5(c) and 5(d)). Taiwan is a traditionally important player in this
sector but the importance of vertical specialization seems to be reducing compared with other coun-
tries. On the other hand, Singapore appears to have relevant vertical specialization activities since
mid-eighties, with a small decline after the mid-nineties. Ireland recorded sharp increases until the
mid-eighties but some decline in vertical specialization occurred afterwards, though maintaining high
levels. The Netherlands shows a steady increase in theBM
* andBX
* indices during this period. Never-
theless, this country is a major European trade warehouse, so part of these transactions may not re-
flect vertical specialization activities. The other industrialized countries identified - US, France,
Germany, UK and Japan - show stable or slightly decreasing vertical specialization activities in this
category.
As for “Radio, TV and communications equipment” (Chart 5(e) and 5(f)), all countries selected are lo-
catedinEastAsia.Taiwanshowsagainadecreasingpathintherelevanceofverticalspecializationac-
tivities, Malaysia holds an important position, though stabilizing after the mid-eighties, and a sizeable
increase is observable in the Philippines and, to a lesser extent, in China.
Products included in the medium-high-tech category, like most machinery items, are typically charac-
terized by a high degree of heterogeneity. This fact might explain why vertical specialization activities
are not identified with this indicator at the aggregate level. However, the application of the chosen
thresholdof 2 for bothBM
* andBX
* to thesub-sectorsof themedium-high-techcategoryallowsus alsoto
detect some well known vertical specialization phenomena, like the “Motor vehicles, trailers and
semi-trailers” sector in Canada and US and the effects of maquiladoras (labour-intensive assembly
operations) on “Other electrical machinery and apparatus” in Mexico.
14
Within low-tech categories, there is only significant evidence of vertical specialization activities in the
“Textiles, textile products, leather and footwear” sector (Chart 6(a) and 6(b)). The countries where it is
moreimportant areBangladeshtogetherwithCambodiaandLaos,the latter showinga sharpincrease
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Chart 6
































* index (b) BX
* index
Sources: CEPII-Chelem database and own calculations.
(14) See Jones, Kierzkowski and Leonard (2002).since the beginning of the nineties. It is interesting to note that vertical specialization in this sector ap-
pears to be also relativelyimportant in North Africa, withcountries like Morocco and Tunisia displaying
upward trends.
5. CONCLUSIONS
In this article we introduced a simple cross-country index of international specialization – the B
* –,
which is suitable to characterize the relative world export structure and to identify the major changes
observed since the late sixties.
TheB
* has a highly intuitive nature: it is simply the share of exports of a given sector in total exports of
each country, normalized by the world unweighted average share. Given the characteristics of theB
*,
the analysis was based on the comparison of different countries within a given sector, i.e. a
cross-country analysis, whereas the more traditional approach on revealed comparative advantages
and international product specialization focuses on the evolution of the export structure of a given
country or group of countries, i.e. a cross-sector analysis.
In the 2000-04 period G5 countries and China are more specialized than the world unweighted aver-
age in high-tech and medium-high-tech goods (the only exception being China in medium-high-tech)
andshowa non-specializationstatus inlow-techandmedium-low-techsectors. The time-seriesanaly-
sis of the B
* reveals that the performance of the Chinese economy in high-tech products is specially
striking: having started with a lower than average share in total exports, it has reached an export pro-
portion that is more than twice the world unweighted average in the last years. On the contrary, in the
low-tech sector, a significant reduction was recorded from the mid-80s onwards, after more than two
decades of high specialization. Nevertheless, China continues to present specialization in some
low-tech subsectors, namely “Other manufacturing and recycling” and “Textiles, textile products,
leather and footwear”.
The identification of relevant vertical specialization activities was accomplished by computing the B
*
for both exports and imports in the different sectors, for the 79 countries (or group of countries), and by
setting a threshold of 2. Although we acknowledgethat intra-industry trade may explain relatively high
values of bothB
* indicators, it is hard to accept that such trade justifies import structures that are twice
the world average. In such cases, vertical specialization activities must be the underlying explanation.
Using these criteria, relevant vertical specialization activities at an aggregate level were found in
high-tech industries and, to a lesser extent, in some medium-high-tech (motor vehicles and electrical
machinery) and low-tech sectors (textiles, clothing and footwear). These activities appear to have in-
tensified in the last decade. In geographical terms, significant vertical specialization activities are
predominantly identified in East Asia, but also in some countries of Europe and North Africa.
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* VALUES FOR 79 COUNTRIES OR GROUPS OF COUNTRIES
(Countries sorted by 2000-04 values of B*)
High techonology
1967-69 2000-04
Rank B* Rank B*
Philippines 60 0.11 1 4.91
Singapore 35 0.71 2 4.29
Malaysia 64 0.08 3 4.20
Ireland 15 1.84 4 3.91
Others in South Europe 28 0.92 5 3.80
Taiwan 2 5.99 6 2.98
Switzerland 1 6.76 7 2.54
South Korea 23 1.15 8 2.43
United Kingdom 6 2.99 9 2.38
Israel 29 0.90 10 2.38
United States 3 4.89 11 2.36
Thailand 71 0.03 12 2.23
Hungary 10 2.12 13 2.19
China, People’s Rep. 48 0.29 14 2.15
Netherlands 5 3.01 15 2.06
Japan 4 3.86 16 2.04
Mexico 22 1.42 17 1.97
Finland 49 0.27 18 1.65
France 8 2.46 19 1.63
Sweden 12 1.92 20 1.60
Denmark 17 1.71 21 1.51
Germany 7 2.58 22 1.28
Hong Kong 11 2.07 23 1.23
Indonesia 66 0.04 24 1.22
BLEU 25 0.99 25 1.06
Austria 21 1.47 26 0.93
Canada 16 1.76 27 0.90
Norway 40 0.58 28 0.84
Former Czechoslovakia 20 1.57 29 0.80
Brazil 26 0.93 30 0.80
Australia 43 0.49 31 0.79
Italy 14 1.88 32 0.75
Portugal 27 0.93 33 0.73
Spain 39 0.63 34 0.72
Greece 52 0.22 35 0.72
Others in America 37 0.67 36 0.70
Morocco 62 0.09 37 0.69
Former Yugoslavia 38 0.64 38 0.65
Gabon 42 0.51 39 0.58
Vietnam 34 0.78 40 0.51
1967-69 2000-04
Rank B* Rank B*
Poland 9 2.24 41 0.45
India 54 0.22 42 0.44
Middle East, no OPEC 19 1.59 43 0.44
Turkey 67 0.03 44 0.42
Gulf 45 0.44 45 0.40
Bolivia 77 0.01 46 0.36
Romania 53 0.22 47 0.35
Former USSR 30 0.89 48 0.35
Colombia 33 0.79 49 0.34
Bulgaria 18 1.61 50 0.33
Others in East Asia 46 0.37 51 0.33
Kenya 44 0.44 52 0.31
Iceland 73 0.02 53 0.30
Sri Lanka 76 0.01 54 0.29
South African Union 47 0.37 55 0.27
New Zealand 65 0.06 56 0.25
African LDCs 61 0.10 57 0.24
Argentina 36 0.70 58 0.23
Uruguay 41 0.58 59 0.22
Tunisia 56 0.16 60 0.21
Others in Africa 59 0.12 61 0.21
Ecuador 13 1.89 62 0.17
Paraguay 79 0.01 63 0.14
Pakistan 51 0.23 64 0.13
Egypt 55 0.19 65 0.11
East Asian LDCs 63 0.09 66 0.10
Venezuela 68 0.03 67 0.10
Albania 57 0.15 68 0.07
Chile 72 0.02 69 0.06
Peru 70 0.03 70 0.04
Cote d’Ivoire 50 0.24 71 0.04
Bangladesh 31 0.87 72 0.03
Nigeria 78 0.01 73 0.02
Saudi Arabia 75 0.02 74 0.02
Brunei Darussalam 69 0.03 75 0.02
Cameroon 32 0.79 76 0.02
Algeria 58 0.14 77 0.01
Libyan Arab Jamahiriya 24 1.02 78 0.01
Cambodia, Laos 74 0.02 79 0.01
Sources: CEPII-Chelem database and own calculations.Banco de Portugal | Economic Bulletin




* VALUES FOR 79 COUNTRIES OR GROUPS OF COUNTRIES
(Countries sorted by 2000-04 values of B*)
Medium-high techonology
1967-69 2000-04
Rank B* Rank B*
Japan 12 2.05 1 2.54
Germany 1 4.00 2 2.50
Saudi Arabia 70 0.06 3 2.31
Spain 19 1.76 4 2.25
Mexico 29 1.07 5 2.22
Former Czechoslovakia 13 2.03 6 2.15
Canada 7 2.61 7 2.09
BLEU 11 2.06 8 2.03
Austria 16 1.88 9 1.98
France 6 2.76 10 1.97
Hungary 20 1.64 11 1.92
Italy 5 2.96 12 1.91
United States 2 3.55 13 1.89
Switzerland 4 3.16 14 1.82
Sweden 9 2.29 15 1.79
United Kingdom 3 3.32 16 1.72
Poland 8 2.48 17 1.71
Portugal 39 0.72 18 1.51
South African Union 27 1.12 19 1.47
South Korea 55 0.29 20 1.47
Former Yugoslavia 22 1.51 21 1.46
Netherlands 15 1.89 22 1.41
Denmark 18 1.84 23 1.37
Brazil 41 0.63 24 1.36
Tunisia 14 1.93 25 1.29
Ireland 46 0.46 26 1.27
Finland 36 0.83 27 1.23
Taiwan 21 1.61 28 1.22
Turkey 50 0.39 29 1.18
Argentina 43 0.56 30 1.13
Colombia 42 0.56 31 1.09
Thailand 76 0.02 32 1.07
Norway 23 1.45 33 1.06
Romania 26 1.15 34 1.02
Morocco 30 1.06 35 1.01
China, People’s Rep. 40 0.71 36 0.95
Former USSR 24 1.34 37 0.93
Bulgaria 17 1.88 38 0.93
Libyan Arab Jamahiriya 38 0.80 39 0.90
Israel 34 0.89 40 0.86
1967-69 2000-04
Rank B* Rank B*
Middle East, no OPEC 25 1.28 41 0.86
Australia 32 1.01 42 0.85
Gulf 62 0.18 43 0.84
India 47 0.42 44 0.82
Venezuela 69 0.06 45 0.79
Greece 35 0.84 46 0.77
Indonesia 71 0.05 47 0.71
New Zealand 68 0.11 48 0.64
Cote d’Ivoire 44 0.56 49 0.62
Singapore 45 0.53 50 0.62
Nigeria 77 0.02 51 0.62
Malaysia 64 0.16 52 0.61
Ecuador 72 0.05 53 0.61
Kenya 37 0.82 54 0.59
Egypt 59 0.26 55 0.53
Others in America 28 1.08 56 0.52
Others in South Europe 31 1.01 57 0.50
Chile 58 0.26 58 0.49
Uruguay 60 0.25 59 0.47
Philippines 66 0.12 60 0.42
African LDCs 61 0.19 61 0.38
Hong Kong 48 0.42 62 0.37
Algeria 10 2.21 63 0.35
Vietnam 49 0.40 64 0.35
East Asian LDCs 73 0.04 65 0.34
Gabon 54 0.34 66 0.33
Others in East Asia 57 0.27 67 0.28
Paraguay 33 0.90 68 0.25
Bolivia 65 0.12 69 0.24
Cameroon 53 0.35 70 0.21
Peru 74 0.03 71 0.20
Iceland 78 0.01 72 0.18
Albania 51 0.38 73 0.17
Sri Lanka 63 0.16 74 0.16
Others in Africa 67 0.12 75 0.12
Pakistan 52 0.38 76 0.11
Bangladesh 79 0.00 77 0.09
Cambodia, Laos 75 0.02 78 0.02
Brunei Darussalam 56 0.27 79 0.02
Sources: CEPII-Chelem database and own calculations.Economic Bulletin | Banco de Portugal




* VALUES FOR 79 COUNTRIES OR GROUPS OF COUNTRIES
(Countries sorted by 2000-04 values of B*)
Medium-low techonology
1967-69 2000-04
Rank B* Rank B*
Algeria 60 0.35 1 3.61
Libyan Arab Jamahiriya 24 1.17 2 3.17
Nigeria 20 1.34 3 3.02
Venezuela 3 3.10 4 3.01
Egypt 66 0.26 5 2.60
Gulf 8 2.30 6 2.48
Peru 14 1.64 7 2.29
Former USSR 17 1.50 8 2.27
African LDCs 10 2.19 9 1.94
Chile 4 2.85 10 1.88
Saudi Arabia 1 3.16 11 1.78
Norway 19 1.42 12 1.74
South African Union 34 0.93 13 1.65
Kenya 13 1.81 14 1.64
Australia 42 0.77 15 1.52
Cameroon 18 1.46 16 1.44
Cote d’Ivoire 51 0.55 17 1.42
Bulgaria 40 0.78 18 1.39
Colombia 29 1.06 19 1.38
Others in America 16 1.54 20 1.37
Greece 37 0.89 21 1.28
Gabon 44 0.74 22 1.13
Middle East, no OPEC 21 1.33 23 1.12
Former Yugoslavia 36 0.90 24 1.10
Poland 35 0.91 25 1.09
Romania 26 1.15 26 1.06
Former Czechoslovakia 27 1.10 27 0.99
Others in Africa 33 0.94 28 0.98
Turkey 55 0.48 29 0.93
Iceland 74 0.11 30 0.91
Others in East Asia 28 1.06 31 0.90
Bolivia 2 3.11 32 0.88
Argentina 73 0.15 33 0.86
Brazil 65 0.30 34 0.85
South Korea 72 0.18 35 0.83
Brunei Darussalam 6 2.72 36 0.80
India 52 0.53 37 0.79
BLEU 22 1.25 38 0.78
Singapore 9 2.28 39 0.78
Ecuador 78 0.01 40 0.77
1967-69 2000-04
Rank B* Rank B*
Spain 41 0.77 41 0.77
Finland 54 0.50 42 0.77
Austria 31 0.95 43 0.76
Italy 46 0.66 44 0.75
Indonesia 5 2.75 45 0.72
Canada 47 0.66 46 0.71
Sweden 38 0.82 47 0.70
Netherlands 43 0.76 48 0.68
Taiwan 53 0.50 49 0.65
Portugal 61 0.33 50 0.61
Germany 45 0.69 51 0.61
France 39 0.78 52 0.61
Albania 25 1.16 53 0.56
United Kingdom 48 0.62 54 0.56
Hong Kong 70 0.22 55 0.55
China, People’s Rep. 62 0.32 56 0.52
Japan 30 0.98 57 0.52
Thailand 23 1.19 58 0.51
Others in South Europe 57 0.44 59 0.51
Denmark 59 0.41 60 0.51
Switzerland 67 0.26 61 0.49
New Zealand 76 0.07 62 0.47
United States 58 0.43 63 0.47
Hungary 50 0.56 64 0.45
Uruguay 68 0.25 65 0.42
Malaysia 7 2.59 66 0.42
Sri Lanka 12 2.09 67 0.40
East Asian LDCs 69 0.25 68 0.39
Mexico 32 0.95 69 0.38
Israel 56 0.46 70 0.34
Morocco 64 0.31 71 0.34
Vietnam 11 2.16 72 0.34
Tunisia 49 0.56 73 0.32
Paraguay 77 0.03 74 0.19
Philippines 71 0.19 75 0.19
Pakistan 75 0.09 76 0.13
Ireland 63 0.32 77 0.10
Cambodia, Laos 15 1.60 78 0.06
Bangladesh 79 0.00 79 0.04
Sources: CEPII-Chelem database and own calculations.Banco de Portugal | Economic Bulletin




* VALUES FOR 79 COUNTRIES OR GROUPS OF COUNTRIES
(Countries sorted by 2000-04 values of B*)
Low techonology
1967-69 2000-04
Rank B* Rank B*
Cambodia, Laos 40 0.97 1 2.50
Bangladesh 2 1.88 2 2.47
Pakistan 6 1.78 3 2.36
Paraguay 9 1.70 4 2.24
Sri Lanka 56 0.64 5 2.10
East Asian LDCs 5 1.79 6 2.08
Albania 32 1.14 7 2.07
Brunei Darussalam 75 0.23 8 2.02
Vietnam 66 0.47 9 1.96
Uruguay 10 1.69 10 1.95
New Zealand 3 1.88 11 1.82
Others in Africa 26 1.34 12 1.78
Iceland 1 1.89 13 1.76
Bolivia 78 0.03 14 1.72
Others in East Asia 28 1.21 15 1.70
Ecuador 7 1.78 16 1.67
Tunisia 35 1.10 17 1.58
Morocco 20 1.48 18 1.54
Hong Kong 15 1.54 19 1.54
Cameroon 46 0.91 20 1.50
India 17 1.51 21 1.44
Gabon 23 1.38 22 1.43
Argentina 12 1.66 23 1.31
Cote d’Ivoire 21 1.45 24 1.29
Indonesia 74 0.26 25 1.26
Middle East, no OPEC 54 0.67 26 1.21
Romania 45 0.94 27 1.20
Turkey 13 1.56 28 1.16
Others in America 53 0.68 29 1.13
Portugal 18 1.49 30 1.08
Kenya 60 0.60 31 1.06
Chile 76 0.15 32 1.05
Greece 30 1.18 33 1.05
Bulgaria 47 0.85 34 1.04
African LDCs 62 0.57 35 1.00
Brazil 16 1.53 36 0.99
Israel 24 1.36 37 0.98
Colombia 34 1.10 38 0.95
Peru 44 0.95 39 0.95
1967-69 2000-04
Rank B* Rank B*
Denmark 36 1.07 40 0.93
China, People’s Rep. 14 1.55 41 0.90
Former Yugoslavia 42 0.96 42 0.82
Australia 29 1.18 43 0.82
Thailand 27 1.23 44 0.81
Finland 22 1.41 45 0.78
Poland 63 0.56 46 0.78
Italy 59 0.61 47 0.77
Austria 48 0.76 48 0.66
Canada 51 0.72 49 0.65
South African Union 37 1.06 50 0.60
Spain 41 0.97 51 0.59
Netherlands 49 0.74 52 0.59
BLEU 61 0.57 53 0.57
Sweden 52 0.69 54 0.55
Norway 55 0.66 55 0.55
Egypt 8 1.71 56 0.54
Others in South Europe 25 1.34 57 0.53
France 64 0.55 58 0.50
Former Czechoslovakia 57 0.62 59 0.47
Former USSR 58 0.62 60 0.46
Hungary 38 1.01 61 0.42
Mexico 39 0.98 62 0.39
United Kingdom 68 0.45 63 0.38
Malaysia 72 0.33 64 0.38
Taiwan 50 0.73 65 0.36
United States 71 0.35 66 0.36
Philippines 4 1.80 67 0.36
Gulf 67 0.47 68 0.35
Germany 73 0.27 69 0.35
Ireland 19 1.48 70 0.34
South Korea 11 1.68 71 0.32
Switzerland 69 0.39 72 0.32
Nigeria 33 1.13 73 0.27
Saudi Arabia 79 0.01 74 0.17
Venezuela 77 0.04 75 0.15
Singapore 70 0.37 76 0.11
Japan 65 0.49 77 0.11
Algeria 31 1.15 78 0.03
Libyan Arab Jamahiriya 43 0.95 79 0.02
Sources: CEPII-Chelem database and own calculations.